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Canadian Warriors in Peacekeeping: Points of Tension in Complex Cultural Encounters

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Executive Summary

This paper is organized into seven sections, each examining a particular dimension of the Canadian deployment in the Former Yugoslavia. The first section addresses the political dimensions to the deployment and the decision to commit the Canadian Forces to UNPROFOR, IFOR and SFOR. We discuss how participation in peace operations is compatible with Canada's national security agenda. Participation is also popular with the Canadian public since it appeals to a Canadian identity of helping others. In addition, participation brings credit to Canada internationally and allows Canada to have a voice in international organizations. The next section examines how the SFOR operation is organized and how training and previous experience prepares Canadians for the mission. We also examine the attitudes that Canadian peacekeepers have towards the mission. In the next section we go on to discuss the relationships that Canadians have with other national contingents and how our NATO experience affects our ability to work with other militaries in SFOR. The next section examines how Canadians organize and maintain relationships with the local population. The final two sections examine relationships that Canadian military personnel have with other organizations in theatre – particularly international and voluntary relief agencies and the media.

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1. Introduction[1]

Canada has a long tradition of participation in peace operations. The first true UN peacekeeping force was conceived of by Lester B. Pearson, then Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs and later Prime Minister of Canada. He received the Nobel Peace Prize for proposing the creation of a multinational force which would place itself between the warring factions in support of a cease fire agreement in the Suez Crisis. Thus, the first official peacekeeping force was deployed to the Sinai under Canadian command in 1956.[2] During the Cold-War period, Canada participated in every UN peacekeeping mission, in addition to several non-UN missions such as the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai. According to Hudlt[3], Canada has rightfully earned the title "old peacekeeper" by virtue of being part of all 13 operations that constituted the first generation of peace operations.

> These states have rightfully earned the honorific label the "UN fire brigade" thought there is obviously no such monopoly anymore. They have been directly involved in the laying of the ground rules for traditional peacekeeping, based on "consent" of the parties involved (and certainly of the host country or countries) and on "impartiality".[4]

Even in the second generation of peace operations, Canada is still prominent at the top of the list of the participants in peacekeeping operations. In terms of the number of troops actually contributed to UN operations, Canada is in third place after France and the United Kingdom.[5] Canada supplies naval and air support in addition to ground

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[1] Funding for this research was received from the Defence and Civil Institute of Environmental Medicine [DCIEM], Canadian Department of Defence. I wish to thank particularly Ross Pigeau for his support of this project. I also wish to thank my research assistants Jason Dunn and Glenn Gilmour for their good humour and hard work on this project.

[2] According to official histories of the UN, the first peacekeeping mission was the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) established in 1948. Canada began participating in this organization only in 1954. However Canada was involved in UN efforts beginning in 1949 in an observer mission in India and Pakistan. Allen G. Sens, "The Decline of the Committed Peacekeeper," in *Canadian Security and Defence Policy: Strategies and Debates at the Beginning of the 21st Century*, ed. Allan G. Sens (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press., 1999), p. 2.

[3] Bo Huldt, "Working Multilaterally: The Old Peacekeepers' Viewpoint," in *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, eds. Donald Daniel and Bradd Hayes (London: MacMillan Press, 1995), p. 105.

[4] Huldt, "Working Multilaterally: The Old Peacekeepers' Viewpoint," p. 105.

[5] Huldt, "Working Multilaterally: The Old Peacekeepers' Viewpoint," p. 107.

forces to its peace operations around the world. For example, Canada provides for the airlift of humanitarian supplies for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and participates in joint NATO naval deployments and air strikes. However, in this paper we will focus upon the activities of the Canadian Army in the Former Yugoslavia (FYU).

Canada was among the first countries to commit troops to the former Yugoslavia.[6] In March 1992 a battle group (from the First Battalion, Royal 22e Regiment) was deployed to the Western Slavonia Region of Croatia. In addition Canadians conducted cordon and search operations, set up roadblocks and checkpoints. Canada also provided the force engineer contingent to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and temporarily deployed to Sarajevo Airport to open the airport and provide security for the delivery of humanitarian aid.[7]

The Canadians gained the confidence of the Krajina Serbs in their area of operations and also the respect of the Croatian Army in the region – until 1993 that is, when the Croats launched an offensive and regained control of all the Krajinas except for Sector East.[8] This offensive succeeded by totally ignoring the UN presence. Knowing full well that the Blue Helmets would not/could not fight to hold ground, the Croats rolled over the Canadians. In addition, in March 1993, the commander of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina asked Canadians to temporarily assure the territorial integrity of Srebrenica and consequently the Second Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment deployed 300 troops to the area.[9] The Canadians occupied eight observation posts around the enclave in addition to escorting convoys, protecting civilians and confiscating weapons.[10] Until April 1994, Canada also supplied persons to the UN Commission of Experts set up to report on human rights violations.

Thus, during UNPROFOR, Canadians were placed in a number of dangerous and difficult circumstances. By January 1995, ten Canadian soldiers had been killed and more than 40 had been seriously injured.[11] There were moments of despair when Canadians were taken hostage[12], moments of glory[13] when Canadians distinguished

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[6] Canada also participated in the European Community Monitor Mission, a non-United Nations mission throughout the former Yugoslavia and the neighboring states of Albania, Bulgaria, and Hungary from September 1991- August 1994. The mission monitored and reported upon the elements of cease-fire agreements, performed humanitarian assistance and participated in confidence-building measures.

[7] Dunne, MAJ Tim, "United Nations and Coalition Operations in the Former Yugoslavia," from http://www.lfaahq.hlfx.dnd.ca/fyi/yugo_hist.htm; Internet; accessed October 4, 1999.

[8] The Croats lost access to most of the Dalmation Coast when the Croatian Serbs seized control of the Krajina region.

[9] For details, see Lenard J. Cohen and Alexander Moens, "Learning the Lessons of UNPROFOR: Canadian Peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia," *Canadian Foreign Policy*, 6, No. 2 (Winter 1999), pp. 85-101.

[10] Following Second Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment, the Second Battalion, Royal 22e Regiment took over the task from May to October 1993 and from November 1993 to March 1994, the protection of the enclave was assured by 156 men and women form the 12e Régiment Blindé du Canada until they were replaced by forces from the Netherlands. (See Dunne, "United Nations and Coalition Operations in the Former Yugoslavia, " from http://www.lfaahq.hlfx.dnd.ca/fyi/yugo_hist.htm).

[11] See Cohen and Moens, "Learning the Lessons of UNPROFOR: Canadian Peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia," p. 94.

[12] In November 1994, 55 Canadians were among approximately 500 UN soldiers taken hostage following NATO air strikes against Serb positions. Canadians were also taken hostage in several other

themselves, and moments of shame when Canadians were involved in breakdowns of discipline.[14] The number of Canadian troops in the FYU reached a peak of 2,600 until reductions began in September 1995. UNPROFOR alone accounted for 2080 Canadian peacekeepers, based on two major units and a logistics battalion, UN military observers, and personnel in the various headquarters. Canada also provided a Major General who served as the Deputy Force Commander. With the signing of the Dayton peace agreement in 1995, Canada deployed a battle group in the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR). IFOR's mandate was limited to twelve months and the Canadian contribution consisted of a Multinational Brigade headquarters with units totalling 1,200 troops.

Following its contribution to IFOR, the Canadian government announced that in December 1996 it would contribute a well-equipped force to the NATO- led Stabilization Force - SFOR. Operation Palladium is Canada's largest peace commitment – approximately 1300 persons. It consists of an infantry battalion group/battle group deployed throughout an area in the western part of Bosnia-Herzegovina near the Croatian border. The Canadians are responsible for one of the largest (183,108km) and most active Areas of Responsibility (AOR) found in the South West Division. In fact, it is the same size as one of our Canadian provinces – Prince Edward Island. The administrative headquarters are in Velika Kladusa, about two hours from Zagreb while the Battle Group Headquarters is further south in Coralici. Other principal centers in the Canadian AOR are Cazin, Bihac, Bosanski Petrova, Zgon and Drvar. The current Canadian contribution can roughly be broken down as follows:

- About 900 troops forming the battle group, which is made up of armored, engineer and strong infantry elements based in Coralici, Drvar and Zgon;
- About 250 troops from service-support units that form the National Support Element stationed in Velika Kladusa;
- A tactical helicopter detachment of three CH-146 Griffon helicopters with about 50 personnel stationed in Velika Kladusa; and
- Other smaller elements, including military police and headquarters staff, who serve in Velika Kladusa at the Canadian Contingent's National Command Element, and others who fill positions in NATO's SFOR Headquarters in Sarajevo.

In addition to documentary sources, research for this paper was carried out in the archives of the Canadian Department of National Defence Headquarters. However, the bulk of our information came from unstructured interviews and focus groups

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incidents. (See Cohen and Moens, " Learning the Lessons of UNPROFOR: Canadian Peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia", pp. 91-92.)

[13] In the Medak pocket incident of September 1993, Canadian troops attempted to interpose themselves between the Serb and Croat front lines in order to maintain a cease fire agreement. The Croatian side opened fire on the Canadians and a number of gun battles took place. Eventually the Croatians fell back. In addition, Canadians observed ethnic cleansing by Croat troops and were able to assist some Serbs in escaping. (See Cohen and Moens, "Learning the Lessons of UNPROFOR: Canadian Peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia," pp. 91-92.)

[14] In 1994, Canadian Soldiers from the 12th Armoured Regiment were involved in incidents in Bacovici Hospital ranging from drunkenness to sexual assault of mental patients. (See Donna Winslow, "The Role of Culture in the Breakdown of Discipline during Peace Operations," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology: Special Issue: Organizational Crisis*, 35, No. 3 (August 1998), pp. 345-368.)

carried out with Canadian soldiers in Bosnia. In October 1998, I conducted field work in the Canadian Area of Responsibility.[15] During my visit, I travelled from one end of the AOR to the other, participating in mounted and on foot patrols. I slept and ate in platoon houses and was even able to closely observe a live fire exercise.

In 1998, the Canadian Forces conducted a survey of ethical risks in peacekeeping and comments on handling these risks.[16] Many of the comments by the 62 respondents, who varied in rank from general officer to corporal, are relevant to our subject. The interviews were semi-structured and open-ended so that there is little quantitative data. However, when the respondents were asked what they felt were the greatest ethical risks that they have experienced in peacekeeping, "cultural differences" topped the list. For example, 45 respondents cited "applying our cultural norms" as an ethical issue encountered in their peace operation experience. The respondents had a variety of peacekeeping experiences. However, it was possible to find some references to deployments in the Former Yugoslavia. We have quoted from those interviews as illustrations of attitudes towards cultural differences in Peace Operations below.

This paper is organized into seven sections, each examining a particular dimension of the Canadian deployment in the Former Yugoslavia. The first section addresses the political dimensions to the deployment and the decision to commit the Canadian Forces to UNPROFOR, IFOR and SFOR. We discuss how participation in peace operations is compatible with Canada's national security agenda. Participation is also popular with the Canadian public since it appeals to a Canadian identity of helping others. In addition, participation brings credit to Canada internationally and allows Canada to have a voice in international organizations. The next section examines how the SFOR operation is organized and how training and previous experience prepares Canadians for the mission. We also examine the attitudes that Canadian peacekeepers have towards the mission. In the next section we go on to discuss the relationships that Canadians have with other national contingents and how our NATO experience affects our ability to work with other militaries in SFOR. The next section examines how Canadians organize and maintain relationships with the local population. The final two sections examine relationships that Canadian military personnel have with other organizations in theatre – particularly international and voluntary relief agencies and the media.

2. Canadian participation in peace operations

Canada participates in peace operations for a variety of reasons. Certainly the peacekeeping image appeals to Canadian popular self-images and sentiments of altruism and generosity, doing good to help others who are suffering, etc. In many ways, peacekeeping contributed to the formation of a Canadian identity in the international arena. Peacekeeping represented Canadian multiculturalism, tolerance

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[15] I wish to thank the Canadian Department of National Defence and the soldiers and officers of the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment Battle Group deployed in Bosnia for taking care of me. I am well aware that such a trip requires time and energy to organize and I am extremely appreciative of the support and information given to me during the trip.

[16] Paul Maillet (ed.), *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report* (Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters, Defence Ethics Program, 1998), hereinafter called the *Ethics Survey* .

and respect for the rule of law. "Peacekeeping had become a mirror, reflecting the finest qualities Canadians ascribed to their own society and national character."[17]

However, there are other more self-motivated reasons for participation in peace operations. During the Cold War, there were Canadian security matters to consider. As Sens points out, international security and national security became intertwined:

> Canada's paramount strategic concern during the Cold War was an escalation of superpower hostilities in Europe or elsewhere into a global confrontation which would threaten Canadian territory. As it became evident that the United States and the Soviet Union could clash in various regional conflicts, Canada acquired an interest in the prevention, control, or containment of hostilities in areas of tension around the world.[18]

This theme appears in Canada's Defence White Papers of that period. Indeed, in 1986, a Special Joint Committee of the Canadian Senate and House of Commons stated that "the threat to Canada is one and the same with the threat to international stability and peace."[19]

In the post Cold-War period, peacekeeping meshes well with Canadian foreign policy conceptions of Canada as a "middle power". General Michel Maisonneuve, former Chief of Operations in UNPROFOR headquarters, tells us, "Canada was able to carve out an independent role within the western world. By demonstrating initiative, Canada was able to find practical solutions to problems not easily solved by the big powers."[20] It is also interesting to note that, according to some observers, Canada's initiative in the Balkans was to some extent influenced by then Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's special sensitivity to the Balkan region, "owing both to his wife's Serbian ethnic background and also to Canada's large South Slavic immigrant community."[21]

As a middle power, Canada relies on a cooperative approach to security issues and a stable environment for international trade. Peacekeeping was seen as a contribution to multilateralism and to the UN. According to Wiseman, peacekeeping "enhanced Canada's reputation as a middle power [and contributed] to Canada's stature and influence in the UN."[22] Participation in peace operations also gave Canada some leverage in international forums. According to Sens: "By contributing contingents to ventures such as peacekeeping Canada hoped to gain a seat at the table, a voice, and

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[17] Allen G. Sens, "The Decline of the Committed Peacekeeper,"in *Canadian Security and Defence Policy: Strategies and Debates at the Beginning of the 21st Century*, ed. Allen G.. Sens (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1999), p. 7.

[18] Sens, "The Decline of the Committed Peacekeeper," p. 5.

[19] Canada, A Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Canada's International Relations, *Independence and Internationalism* (Ottawa, June 1986), p. 34.

[20] Michel Maisonneuve, "Practical Aspects of the Use of Force in Peace Operations,"in *Peacekeeping with Muscle: The Use of Force in International Conflict Resolution*, eds. Alex Morrison, Douglas Fraser and James Kiras (Cornwallis Park, NS: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997), p. 144. See also "Speaking notes for an address by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney on the occasion of the centennial anniversary convocation", Stanford University, 29 September 1991.

[21] Cohen and Moens, "Learning the Lessons of UNPROFOR: Canadian Peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia," p. 87.

[22] Henry Wiseman, "United Nations Peacekeeping and Canadian Policy: A Reassessment," *Canadian Foreign Policy* (Fall 1993), 1, No. 3, p. 138.

therefore some input into decision-making forums."[23] Thus, foreign policy, public and elite opinion favored an internationalist approach and Canadian participation in international security.

The Canadian military has argued that it is still primarily a combat force. However, over the years, peace operations have become the military's primary function. During the Cold War, peacekeeping was seen as secondary to issues of collective defense; later, however, peacekeeping became a key element in the military's battle for government and public support of defense budgets. In addition, peace operations did provide the military with some form of operational experience. [24] Jockel has noted that, during this time, Canada evolved from being a reluctant peacekeeper into a committed peacekeeper.[25]

In the post Cold-War period and particularly in the 199Os, Canada supported the more robust forms of peace operations and humanitarian intervention. Then Prime Minister Brian Mulroney talked about the necessity of "rethinking the limits of national sovereignty" in a world of intra-state and transnational problems. This coincided with a surge in peace operations by Canadians.[26] However, these new forms of operations were considerably different from those of the past. For example, the UNPROFOR mission proved risky and dangerous to Canadian troops. Between 1991 and 1994, Canadians suffered casualties, kidnappings and hostage-taking. This did not go over well with the Canadian public. A January 1994 Angus Reid-Southam News Poll found that 57% of those Canadians who were surveyed wanted Canada to withdraw from Bosnia when the contribution was slated to end.[27]

The Canadian government also became concerned about the financial and human costs of the more robust forms of peace operations. Nevertheless, support for peace operations continued. According to Sens, these operations were still in Canada's national interests in the post Cold-War period. Peace operations "contributed to the resolution or containment of conflicts which could threaten international or regional peace and stability." Contributions to peace operations continued to be expressions of Canada's commitment to the UN and to regional organizations. This "remained an important outlet for Canadian diplomacy on a wide range of issues." Sens goes on to tell us that "the desire to be both represented and consulted on international affairs continued to be an important driving force behind Canadian foreign policy , and peacekeeping helped maintain Canada's profile and influence as an independent sovereign actor in the world". Finally, participation in the operations in the former Yugoslavia were expressions of Canada's ongoing commitment to European security and to NATO. [28]

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[23] Sens, "The Decline of the Committed Peacekeeper," p. 6.

[24] Sens, "The Decline of the Committed Peacekeeper," p. 7.

[25] Joseph T. Jockel, *Canada and International Peacekeeping*, Canada Series 16 (Washington, D.C.: Centre for Strategic and International Studies and Toronto: Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994), p. 11.

[26] For details, see Sens "The Decline of the Committed Peacekeeper".

[27] See Doug Fischer, "Poll Indicates Most Want Peacekeepers Out of Bosnia," *Ottawa Citizen*, January 25, 1994, p. A1.

[28] Sens, "The Decline of the Committed Peacekeeper, p. 14.

This said, the latest trend in Canadian foreign policy is towards "soft power",[29] that is, the belief that "knowledge and information confer international influence."[30] The current Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, has described "soft power" as "[p]unching above your weight. In Canada's case... ideas, values, persuasion, skill, [and] technique."[31] What this essentially means "is affecting and influencing behavior by information, by values and by forms of non-intrusive intervention."[32]

This emphasis on "soft power" has coincided with considerable reductions in the defence budget[33] and resulting loss of "hard power" capabilities. The new buzz word is "peacebuilding" (efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict[34]). This has led to support for "human security", a concept also championed by Lloyd Axworthy:

> The concept of human security recognizes that human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, sustainable development and social equality are as important to global peace as are arms control and disarmament. It follows from this that, to restore and sustain peace in countries affected by conflict, human security must be guaranteed just as military security must. This is where peacebuilding comes in: as a package of measures to strengthen and solidify peace by building a sustainable infrastructure of human security. Peacebuilding aims to put in place the minimal conditions under which a country can take charge of its destiny, and social, political, and economic development become possible.[35]

If Canada is going to support this package of measures to solidify peace, then civil – military cooperation will be an even more important component of peace operations in the future. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), humanitarian agencies, local representatives, and the military will all have to collaborate closely in future efforts to restore and maintain global peace.

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[29] For a review of the debate surrounding soft power in Canada, see Dr. Dean Oliver, "Soft Power and Canadian Defence", *Strategic Datalinks*, No. 76 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, February, 1999).

[30] Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Foreign Policy in the Information Age" Policy Statement 96/53 (Ottawa: December 1996).

[31] Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, quoted in "'We're Doing Things Nobody Else Could Do,'" *Ottawa Citizen*, April 5, 1998, p. A7.

[32] Lloyd Axworthy, quoted in Mike Trickey, "Canada, Norway Change Their Ways," *Ottawa Citizen* May 28, 1998, p. A18.

[33] The Canadian defense budget fell from $CDN12 billion in 1994 to $CDN 9.25 billion in 1999. This represents a 25% reduction in fiscal outlays, which have resulted in force reduction. Between 1989 and 1999 there was a 30% force reduction. The Canadian Forces have gone from 126,000 in 1962 to 100,000 in 1968 to 80,000 in 1975 and are currently in 1999 60,600. The Land Forces now total 20,900 with seven battalions. (Sens, "The Decline of the Committed Peacekeeper," p.19.)

[34] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Dipolomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations, 1992), p. 32.

[35] Lloyd Axworthy, "Building Peace to Last: Establishing A Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative," Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, York University, October 30, 1996, p. 2.

3. Force structure, preparation and training

Canada rotates whole battle groups into the AOR for six months at a time.[36] These groups are drawn from the Canadian Army Regiments. The group that was in the AOR during my visit was the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment (3RCR). It was the second group or "roto" from the Royal Canadian Regiment to be in Bosnia and was replaced by another Battle Group from the Royal Canadian Regiment. The following three rotations of six months each will be from the Royal 22e Regiment, etc.. In this way, there is continuity in the operations since members of the Royal Canadian Regiment handing off their rotation to the next group know the group's members, are used to working with them, and share the same standard operating procedures.

The battle group carries out NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR) tasks in accordance with Canadian strategic direction. This Headquarters in Velika Kladusa interprets this direction and gets it to the troops. The mission of the 3RCR Battle Group is to "conduct operations to prevent hostilities within the AOR, implementing the military tasks of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) and supporting Civil Development, in order to achieve a secure environment, adequate for the continued consolidation of the peace without further need for NATO led military forces in BH." The military aspects include liaison; cantonment site/GOF[37] inspections; monitoring of the entities (Serb, Croatian, and Bosnian military forces); mine monitoring and visible SFOR training.[38]

The Overall Operational Focus is to ensure that Entity Armed Forces[39] (EAF) become Political Forces. Therefore, there is a need to ensure EAF compliance. "There is a general lack of respect here for the rule of law, we need to encourage civil development in a secure environment where the rule of law prevails. The SFOR commander has established that "rule of law" is our centre of gravity." In order to do so, the Canadians watch the potential for violence in the Muslim/northern part of the AOR and maintain force protection in Drvar. The last group was surprised by riots that took place in Drvar over the return of displaced persons. These soldiers now do more wheeled patrols in rural areas and more foot patrols in the built-up areas. This increases contact with the locals and the Canadians increase confidence by wearing fewer flack jackets.

Securing the environment is the "bread and butter" of the mission. However, the civilian aspects are becoming more and more important. The civilian aspects are the SFOR campaign pillars: economic recovery; demining; police; DPRE (displaced

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[36] Within the AOR there are different rotations methods. For example, in Bihac there are approximately 40 people who are rotated from Coralici about every two months. The rotation of units into Bihac on a regular basis it is seen as a good leadership opportunity. Also, troops are less bored and no one becomes « king of the roost » so to say. The down side is the loss of intelligence which can be gathered over an extended period of six months. In the Para company there is no rotation. The group will stay the whole six months in their platoon house. In this way "you get recognition from the locals".

[37] GOF refers to ordnance depots.

[38] While in the AOR, I was able to participate in a live-fire exercise which took place right beside an Entity military camp.

[39] There are only two forces in the Canadian AOR- The Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Home Defence Council (the VRX, i.e. Serbs, are not in the AOR.)

persons refugees and evacuees); elections; arms control; and common institutions (which is a minor activity consisting mainly of monitoring licence plates). These civilian aspects of the mission mean new tasks for the Canadian Forces and, as in other peace operations, decision-making is pushed downwards: "In wars a battle group has a predetermined task and dealing with displaced persons, etc., was handled much higher up the chain. Here it is the Battle Group Commander J. who now has to deal with these matters." Similarly, I was told "Now in UN ops the Brigade aspect is missing - formerly the Brigade and national HQ dealt with the international aspects - now Battle Group deals with international aspects. So in a UN tour captains are getting experience because decision-making is pushed down lower."

Some soldiers are not happy with the increasing emphasis on the civilian aspects to the mission. They do not like doing these civilian aspects because it was "not what we trained for which was green." However, for the most part, Canadian soldiers see the value of their presence in Bosnia. For example, the recent elections held there went off without a hitch. They go out on patrol over the whole region in order to show an SFOR presence. Freedom of movement is now increasing. One young soldier told me that we should do more humanitarian aid and he thinks that we should stay because if we leave the Entities will start "duking it out again." One veteran of many tours described the impact of their presence over the three missions: In UNPROFOR - they were shooting at us and children were throwing rocks at us. In IFOR - we were taking the guns away from the big guys. In SFOR – we see people coming back, children are waving at us." According to the men in one mounted patrol I was on, this mission is better than the others because of better food, living quarters and hot showers. They also told me that the financial incentive they receive for peace ops is really important: "It can help you get out of debt, pay a car or make the down payment on a house." Nevertheless, they believed strongly that their presence keeps the peace.
There are 1314 people (including 277 local civilians) working in the Canadian camps. 3RCR contributes 883 people (seven subunits). The administration company in Velika Kladusa (VK) has 150 persons. According to that Battle Group Commander: "From Canada, information is filtered through VK - mainly because most business is financial. They interface with Canada on the administrative stuff and we focus on the AOR. I don't need guidance from them. The Battle Group focuses on the AOR and the HQ on administration - so I don't have to be thinking about that." The administration section includes the padres, medical services, supply organization, cooks, maintenance, and communicators. The padres are in VK and in Zgon - the two extremes. VK covers Coralici and Zgon covers Dvaar. Padres play an important role in terms of morale. There is also a military psychologist deployed with the unit, stationed in Coralici. This person reports directly to the commander of the Battle Group in addition to administering unit climate surveys which are intended to monitor unit morale. The advanced surgical team (AST) and the military police (MP) are separate and technically part of the Canadian Contingent Stabilization Force (CCSFOR).

Soon after I left the AOR, Griffon helicopters came in. This means an additional 50 people joined the contingent. I was told that there was some tension arising from the control of the resources of the Griffons. "There is discussion as to who will control the tasks of the helicopters. SFOR thinks the helicos are here to serve SFOR, the Canadians say they are here primarily for the Canadians." In addition to the Griffons, the Canadians will receive other force multipliers like the Coyote reconnaissance

vehicle.[40] *When this occurs, during the* Royal 22e Regiment's series of rotations, this will permit them to reduce the number of personnel in Bosnia. This is important since Canada has other important commitments in the Balkans, having sent over a thousand soldiers to Kosovo.

Of the 883 members of the Battle Group, 520 had been working together since the summer of 1997. The other 250 came in December 1997 or January 1998. The other people in the Battle Group (regular service, reservists, and augmentees) came in only a few weeks before deployment. Normally, reservists come from the Queen's Own Rifles but, since they could not meet all the manpower demands, the Battle Group got reservists from all over Canada. I was told: "Having people working together over a longer period (than just a few weeks prior to deployment) is better". This said, the companies with large number of reservists were working well. Those groups which, like the engineers, had young reservists were dealing with the reservists by seeing that they were supervised by senior personnel: "There are 13 Reservists who are very young (18-19 yrs old) who are supervised by more experienced personnel. So for example one field section is made up of nine people with one Sergeant (12 - 15 years' time in); one Master Corporal (8-12 years) ands seven Corporal./sappers (mixed - very young and old)." Similarly, for most of the NCOs, the rotation I observed was their second to fourth tour. This is important since the platoon commanders are all young officers who are for the most part on their first tour.

Another important factor in the Canadian context is the advantage of being a small army.[41] At the higher levels, "we know each other ...we are comfortable with each other." The Brigade Commander, the Battle Group Commander the Colonel in Velika Kladusa all know each other. "We know and trust each other; thus we work on the assumption that they know what is best for the Battle Group. This makes for a smooth operation." Another officer told me "The Army is a small organization and the command and staff element knew each other from working together in Petawawa. We all have a feel for each other. Knowing each other is a big benefit. The unfortunate thing is that it is not always possible. It is best to take a unit and a HQ that is used to working together and deploy them together. One example is the Dragoons who usually work with 2RCRJ artillery that trains with them. As Officer Commanding (OC) of the unit we took a captain who was used to working with us rather than a major who did not know us." The Commander of the Battle Group echoed this: "The group has a history of working together. It was a seamless transition to YUGO, a well-oiled team. Ad hoc groupings are inferior. At least you need a critical mass of people who are used to working with each other - 75 - 80% at least. Thus everyone is a known quantity." Therefore, it seems that whether a person is a good soldier is not as important as how well one knows the soldier and, therefore, can anticipate what to expect from him or her. Also, working together means that everyone is familiar with the same procedures.

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[40] This will be a big improvement since the vehicles that the Canadians are using are extremely old kit. Some soldiers are driving vehicles which are older than they are. These vehicles were refitted with ceramic and kevlar which made them too heavy, so the suspension, wheel drums, etc. need constant work. This affects morale. Other equipment is sorely in need of repair. For example, the demining machine was not functional at all when I was there.

[41] There are approximately 21,000 in the Canadian Army, of which 5000 are in the combat arms.

The down side of having such a small army, however, is that the high operational tempo which can deleteriously affect the members of the Canadian Forces. A member of the Canadian Army can expect to have many tours during his or her military career. This takes a high toll on the family and personal life of these men and women. There is burn-out not only from the stress of the job, but also from the stress of constant deployment. This is more true for some trades than for others. "The smaller the trade gets, the more times you are sent away". Some of soldiers I met had done three rotations in seven years: "It's good for the money and hard on family life. There is lots of marital burn-out. Some marriages are stronger but not many. Releases [i.e., leaving the service], go up after a tour." Constant rotations can also affect the ability of a soldier to perform well in-theatre. As one soldier quoted from the Ethics Survey puts it:"[W]hen a member is exposed to more than one mission, I feel that the risks increase and mission focus diminishes." [42]

In terms of training, we saw above that the majority of the Battle Group begins training for a mission six months prior to deployment. This training is organized at the Battle Group level and includes mainly combat exercises, mine awareness, etc. but also cultural awareness and orientation to the AOR. There was a pre-deployment exercise in Arkansas. There is also training in theatre - monthly rules of engagement (ROE) training, general purpose combat training, live-fire training and scenario training such as dealing with a car accident in the AOR. "These in-theatre combat exercises are necessary to secure the environment in that they demonstrate that we have good combat capabilities." Everyone down to the private knows the pillars of the mission. They are all given memo cards setting out the mission and the pillars are posted around camp and even in platoon house bathrooms.

It is particularly interesting to note that almost all the people I talked to in my tour of the AOR, from soldier to commanding officer, were in agreement that another event had been more significant in terms of training– an ice storm. In the winter of 1997-1998, a severe ice storm struck eastern Canada. Power was knocked out in some regions for as long a three weeks. It was a national disaster and the military was called in. Many of the people on the rotation had participated in the ice storm disaster relief. This event not only gave them experience in working together, it also gave them experience in dealing with many situations similar to those encountered in Bosnia. "The training nut is a hard one to crack. The January 1998 ice storm was a great training event. It meant dealing with daily life when life is upside down. We derived great benefit from the experience especially for the liaison staff who had to work with local mayors etc. We all worked in that ice storm." As one NCO commented, "The ice storm prepared us more for the operation that pre-deployment training." Another added, "The Ice Storm was a better preparation dealing with people arguing over wood, taking food for themselves, but most of all the 'do it for me attitude'. In the ice storm, people were waiting for the Army to clear their driveway for them. Big healthy men waiting for us to come and do it for them. Families here in Bosnia also wait for the Army to come and build their roof or house for them instead of moving into town or doing it for themselves." Of course, Canadian soldiers recognize that training will never mirror exactly conditions in-theatre. "This was a very challenging experience which Canada did try to prepare me for; however, reality is always the harshest teacher."[43] UNPROFOR was particularly challenging, "Regardless of any experiences

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[42]Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 29/34.
[43]Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 34/34.

you have seen prior to participating in a mission, nothing can prepare one's self for the atrocities of war."[44]

Nonetheless, deficiencies in training do exist. One of the most important aspects of training noted in the Ethics Survey is the need for more detailed cultural awareness training: "[We need] programs in world history, international affairs, international law, international development, etc."[45] "It is most important for peacekeepers to be made aware of customs/patters[sic] of behaviour in area of operations."[46] "[We need] cross-cultural awareness/political/social in relation to the mission area. Sadly, most Canadians are ignorant and make mistakes because of this lack of "soft" knowledge."[47] "When I did my tour, there was little/no in-brief; and after a year of civil war, I had virtually no out-brief. Preparation via education in what lies ahead on a foreign tour is essential, I believe."[48] "A better preparation in regards to the background, and background and beliefs of the local populations, is called for. A better informed soldier will be better equipped to make the right decision and will be less likely to find himself in a tempting or compromising position."[49] "Better prepare our people for UN tours – advise them on the cultural differences." [50]

Rules of Engagement (ROE) pose a particular training challenge. The Ethics Survey shows that Canadian soldiers were critical of the training they received on the ROE and the limits they imposed on the use of force by soldiers in-theatre. "[We need] continuous in-theatre training [on the ROE use of force] to ensure troops do not "defend" materiel too vigorously."[51] "I found my ROE to be very frustrating. I essentially had to wait until I was fired upon before I could draw my weapon! My personal safety was jeopardized. As well, as a peace officer, I found it frustrating that I couldn't use anything but lethal force (i.e. no intermediate weapons)."[52] General Maisonneuve gives one example where the limits on use of force placed soldiers in the position where they were forced to use more, not less, force: "Riot control agents cannot be used against belligerents. Thus, during the riots of April 1996, the Czech battalion, under the operational control of [Canadian] Brigadier General Jeffries, was forced to fire warning shots."[53]

The Ethics Survey also pointed to problems in having variance in ROEs."[We need to] [b]e very specific on our ROEs, and our responsibilities towards non-combatants and combatants."[54] "In UNPF (United Nations Peace Forces), Canadians had two sets of ROE, one for Bosnia, one for Croatia, this was especially difficult for soldiers who

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[44]Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 33/34.
[45]Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 26/34.
[46]Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 25/35.
[47]Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 24/34.
[48]Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 24/34.
[49]Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 23/34.
[50]Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 23/34.
[51]Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 27/34.
[52]Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 34/34.
[53] Michel Maisonneuve, "Practical Aspects of the Use of Force in Peace Operations," in *Peacekeeping with Muscle: The Use of Force in International Conflict Resolution*, eds., Alex Morrison, Douglas Fraser, and James Kiras, (Cornwallis Park, NS: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997), p. 151.
[54]Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 24/34.

traditional peacekeeping."[60] Moreover, Canada's declining defense budget means that there are less military resources and capabilities available. Dwindling land force capacity will affect Canada's ability to sustain prolonged substantial commitments abroad. This may also have an effect on Canada's place and ability to influence peace operations in the Balkans. According to the executive director of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, "Our rhetoric will start to ring hollow unless it is backed up by resources.... There has been minimal investment in our international commitments."[61] There was already an indication of this when Canada's position in opposition to air strikes was overridden. In 1994, Canada was excluded from the Contact Group, which became the primary mechanism for policy on the Balkans. According to Sens, "Canada's allies were dissatisfied with Canada's contribution to IFOR."[62]

Under SFOR, the Canadians operate within a multinational force that includes battalions from the Czech Republic and Belgium/Luxembourg, a battle group from the Netherlands, and two from the United Kingdom (UK). The Canadian commander has limited contact with commanders of other contingents and there is little contact with other national units on his flanks. Little time is spent "liaising" with flanking units, since he spends most of the time in his own AOR. There is some contact with Multinational Head Quarters (HQ) in Banja Luka (now capital of the Republika Serpska) and National HQ which is the UK. Multinational HQ consists of the Dutch, Belgians, three Canadians but mainly UK.

The Canadians have a long tradition of working with the UK and share standard operating procedures. When Canadians were stationed in Germany they were also attached to the UK. Since Canadians pulled out of Germany, there has been less opportunity to train in a multinational environment. In the long term, this may affect Canada's interoperability. "One of the things we lost when we pulled out of Germany was the opportunity to train in a multinational environment (the commanders here have experience from Germany)" "We have begun to drift away since we left Germany. We are losing touch with the SOPs etc." "My experience in Germany was invaluable - we were open then to new ways of doing things. It's a shame that folks coming up don't get that experience. They get low level exchanges and that is not the same as training at the core level in integrating forces as we did in Germany. It is not as intense as it was in Germany. We try to get together with exchanges e.g. we exchange people with the Brits and the Czechs but the mission is busy so we don't have time to play around with professional development. The focus is on the AOR."

According to Canadian General Maisonneuve: "[In IFOR] problems of interoperability are lessened by the fact that most of the troops are from NATO."[63] Under IFOR, there were 14 non-NATO nations (13 Partnership for Peace and one other). However, the vast majority of the major troop-contributing nations belong to NATO. Also it is important to note that the Partnership for Peace program promotes interoperability among the participants. The General describes this interoperability as "common doctrine and procedures, as well as interoperable equipment. The method of

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[60] Sens, "The Decline of the Committed Peacekeeper," p. 18.

[61] Daryl Copeland quoted in Marcus Gee, "World's Poor Overlooked as Foreign Aid Stays Low", *The Globe and Mail*, 18 February 1999, p. A20.

[62] Sens, "The Decline of the Committed Peacekeeper." p. 21.

[63] Maisonneuve, "Practical Aspects of the Use of Force in Peace Operations," p. 149.

worked in both countries..."[55] "Developing ROE for IFOR seemed to be problematic. Canadian ROE were different that those of the Division we worked for...."[56] [We didn't maintain] the same status quo within participating nations, ie., ROE's."[57]

4. Military tensions in theatre

Once the national decision was taken to commit Canadian troops to UNPROFOR, the logical choice was to send our NATO Brigade since they were already at a high state of readiness, well-equipped, and only hours away by train. The first tension arose with the UN, which did not think that sending a fully mechanized brigade "fit" with the image of a peacekeeping force. The difference between civilian considerations and military security issues clashed. According to the Canadian Division Commander at that time, Major-General Robert Gaudreau:

> The UN bureaucrats, mainly concerned with costs, would have preferred to limit armored vehicles to one company per unit. Our national concerns [were] the physical security of our troops and the recognition, based on experience, that a show of force not only provides immediate safety but also critical flexibility should the situation deteriorate.[58]

Canada eventually sent a fully-mechanized battalion (CANBAT) with its integral support weapons and a mechanized engineer regiment. According to Major-General Gaudreau, the first consequence was that the Force Commander realized that the Canadians were the only troops to give him some operational flexibility. The Canadians were identified as the sole source for a Force Reserve. This led to difficulties for the Contingent Commander:

> Canada's national policy is that Canadian command should not be divided and operational missions need to be directly related to the mandate agreed to on deployment. This means that the Contingent Commander needs to get national approval for in-theatre changes to the deployment, grouping or mission as accepted. This national restriction... goes against UN thinking which sees troops deployed under full operational command as opposed to operational control.[59]

The participation of the great powers, and particularly of the United States, in recent peace operations in the Balkans will probably serve to marginalize Canadian input. "Canada cannot expect to have the same level of input or voice into collective decision making or operational planning and execution as it did in the era of

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[55] Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 21/34.

[56] Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 21/34.

[57] Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 20/34.

[58] Major-General Gaudreau, "Would a United Nations Fighting Force Have Changed Events in Croatia in 1992?" in *Peacekeeping with Muscle: The Use of Force in International Conflict Resolution*, eds. Alex Morrison, Douglas Fraser, and James Kiras (Cornwallis Park, NS: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997), p. 140.

[59] Gaudreau, , "Would a United Nations Fighting Force Have Changed Events in Croatia in 1992?" p. 140.

'certification' conducted by the alliance for the non-NATO members ensured all contributors were able to employ their full capabilities, and understood the rules of engagement (ROEs)". [64] In addition, the common values and shared military cultures of NATO nations such as Canada make for better communication and common standards in the application of the mandate.[65]

Canadians also promote interoperability through exchanges. In Coralici, there were British, American, and Dutch Intelligence officers at the Battle Group headquarters when I visited. Since IFOR, Canadians have commanded Czech Republic troops. There are also exchanges among the armored units where Canada exchanges with the British. (For example, we send one crew of three people for one-week exchanges). While I was in Coralici, I observed a joint training - a traffic accident scenario. The Czechs played non-English-speaking participants in the drama (they were really hamming it up and having a lot of fun being difficult for the Canadians to do "crowd control") and the British liaison team was running and observing how the Canadians handled the situation. "They - the Brits - are fully integrated participants in our team," comments an officer. This was an example of inter military co-operation and building good relations between the three groups. I observed much camaraderie between the three groups. I was told that the Canadians respect the Czechs who are "serious" soldiers with a lot of firepower. I was also told the other contingents think that we are soft because we give our people three weeks leave and extra money for deploying overseas. The British coming from Germany actually lose money coming to the former Yugoslavia.

However, while there appears to be a common military culture that promotes effective co-ordination among NATO countries, significant differences arise when the Canadian military works with some non-NATO countries. The Ethics Survey conducted with Canadian Forces members reveals that cultural tensions are prevalent in multi-national deployments. These included differences between Canadian and some other UN forces on substantive ethical issues, such as participating in the black market. "Other [problems] involved some contingent's views of officer status vs. that of soldiers. Specifically taking the rations provided by the UN, feeding the contingent members at different standards based on rank and selling the remainder on the black market."[66] "Different degrees of compliance with host nation rules and regulations (e.g. with respect to money changing on 'black market' – Canadians would be sent home whereas other contingents freely and actively participated – up to the Commanding Officer level."[67] "It was clear that neighboring nations were black marketing fuel, yet due to the 'political' considerations this went unchallenged."[68] "UN troops involved in black marketeering at the expense of the war-torn area. UN troops involved in providing prostitutes for other UN troops. If these had been Canadian troops I could have <u>enforced</u> Canadian law; but they came from other countries and all I could do was report incidents to their contingents."[69] "It does

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[64] Maisonneuve, "Practical Aspects of the Use of Force in Peace Operations," p. 151.

[65] For further information on cultural interoperability see Donna Winslow and Col Peer Everts, "Cultural Interoperability for NATO: UNPROFOR and SFOR Compared," in *NATO: The First Fifty Years*, eds. Gustav Schmidt and Jack Granatstein. (London: Macmillan, 1999), forthcoming.

[66] Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 17/34.

[67] Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 15/34.

[68] Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 15/34.

[69] Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 12/34.

... become an ethical dilemma when dealing with other UN Forces who do not adhere to the ethical standards.... We must have the ethical backbone to call our "allies" to task when we see, or believe, they are acting beyond the bounds (Example: black marketeering). Offending a foreign national unit by telling the truth should not be the driving force that puts the lid on events."[70] "[S]ome UN officials were caught stealing hotel silverware and using UN-procured material for their personal benefit."[71] "Ukrainian and Russian UN employees purchased huge quantities of staples required for Bosnia, i.e., fuel, potatoes, cabbage, etc. and then moved into other areas to sell them for profit. This was reported to the Ukrainian and Russian contingents, yet no action was taken."[72] "I believe that there is a risk that CF resources may be inappropriately 'donated' to non-CF agencies or persons. Examples include fuel, food, materiel and supplies that may be given to non-government agencies (NGOs), other forces or local persons."[73]

Other problems arose from different value systems among the contingents. . "I have observed that the different cultural values, not only within different groups in the host country, but also among the components of a multi-national deployment, appear the most prevalent in causing stress."[74] "[T]here is a big difference in standards between the countries that take part in UN missions because of their own cultures."[75] "Differences between ethical standards of host nations and especially between other contingents who may have different value systems (especially with respect to harassment, gender integration, etc.)."[76] "The difference in standard between the various contingents, and the level of authority and discipline over the troops/members."[77] "We did ... face major problems in dealing with the cultural differences between UN civilians and other countries views of ethics."[78]

When I asked about working with non-NATO and non-Warsaw Pact countries, I was told "that would be very difficult because of the differences in military culture and basic cultural differences. There are significant differences in the way things are done between militaries, e.g., the relationship between officers and senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) or officers and non-commissioned members (NCMs). General Maisonneuve specifically critiques the participation of Third World troops:

> Today Third World nations see UN participation as a way of improving their cash flows. In many cases, conditions in the home nations of these forces are little better than those in which they are deployed; consequently, their perceptions, attitudes and actions will reflect this.[79]

General Maisonneuve adds:

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[70] Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, pp. 32/34-33/34.
[71] Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 21/34.
[72] Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 21/34.
[73] Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 13/34.
[74] Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 20/34.
[75] Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 20/34.
[76] Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 10/34.
[77] Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 12/34.
[78] Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 29/34.
[79] Maisonneuve, "Practical Aspects of the Use of Force in Peace Operations," p. 147.

> The equipment, personnel and training of the military forces of Third World nations may not be adequate for the peacekeeping role they are assigned. Countries which may not be familiar with the use of force, are not equipped properly, and have not received adequate training in the use of force, may have problems applying the required force. In fact, when the need is there, they may be more of a hindrance than a help. As an example, during the first attack of sector South by Croatian forces in January 1993, some nations' forces reacted well, and were prepared to use force. Other forces cowered in their bunkers and were just one more problem for the UN commander to solve.[80]

Thus, it appears that Canadian soldiers view NATO's forces as more professionally competent than the UN's forces. As one soldier from the Ethics Survey stated: "I was initially very bothered by the incompetence of the UN, but realized that the UN also recognized this by ultimately handing over to NATO."[81]

5. Military relationships with the locals

In the SFOR rotation I observed, the Canadian military liased with Municipal and Cantonment officials, particularly the Ministry of Reconstruction. It also had to deal with ethnic conflict in the local governments and remain neutral. For example, "We have to deal with Serbs and Croats. For example, the Deputy mayor is Croat and is the acting mayor since the Serb mayor is not here. However, the Serb reps on the town council are stonewalling the Croat. The Serbs are also fighting amongst themselves. They can't agree on anything. We treat everyone as equal."

The military also meets with the local police force weekly and provides security if the United Nations civilian police (CIVPOL) are not able to be there. According to one officer, "the IPTF (UN International Police Task Force) is ineffective. We have to monitor the monitors. We were the ones who had to get the local police going." And a warrant officer mentioned: "The IPTF (can be from different countries and not always from the best country to set the example of good policing (e.g. Malaysians, Ghanaians, Pakistanis)."

The local community sees SFOR and the Canadians as friends and partners, as the emphasis of the mission becomes more one of hearts and minds. "We are not an occupying force. We have a lot of eyes and ears on the ground." They do not buy food locally (they do not want to create a false and dependent economy), and, therefore, their food comes from Denmark.[82] They do not buy fuel here either, but they buy some construction material. Of course, soldiers spend some money here but I do not think it is significant since the Canadian camps are very much like prisons. Soldiers are not allowed out into town except when they stop to have coffee while on patrol. The goal is to have a very visible presence and to use those coffee stops to gather information.

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[80] Maisonneuve, "Practical Aspects of the Use of Force in Peace Operations," p. 148.

[81] Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 34/34.

[82] It cost about two million Canadian dollars a month in food for the group. This amount of money would have a large impact on the local economy.

The Canadians also operate a radio show and distribute pamphlets about their mission. "We try to influence the local population via radio. Leaflets, etc.. The goal is to infect them with Canadian western values plus give them information." Gathering and disseminating information is another of the important aspects to the Canadian mission in Bosnia. The military is not a co-ordinator of humanitarian effort so much as a conduit of information - when contacted they give information - e.g., community x needs such and such. The SFOR soldiers also collect census data of who has come back to the villages. And any information about UXOs (unexploded ordnance) they can get. Platoons collect information on each returnee. They keep this information on cardex and will pass them on to the next roto. The Canadians are developing a Displaced Persons and Refugees (DPRE) data base which they update monthly with the results from the civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) teams' canvas of the area. Also, information that is gathered is passed onto the NGOs so that they know that there are families in isolated area "x" that have returned and are in need of food and perhaps a roof on their house before winter sets in.

Local people do work for Canadians. For example, in Camp Holopina there were 70 civilians employed who had to be paid and overseen. Canadians even pick them up and take them home. The civilians work in the kitchen, garbage, sanitation, laundry, grounds maintenance, etc. In addition, the Canadians use local contractors for some work. This seems to be a source of tension. "We are having trouble with the Bosnian contractors who still have the old communist regime mentality of getting paid even if they don't do the work. Therefore, everything is put off until tomorrow. Our translator helps. She's Croatian with no ties to the local contractors or businessmen. Therefore she can be effective. The local translators have problems dealing with the locals." The translators are an important link to the local population and accompany many patrols.

The Commander of the Battle Group decides the humanitarian thrust of the rotation (for example, the group I observed was concerned with medical infrastructure – they established a dental clinic and rebuilt the psychiatric wing of the Bihac hospital). The Canadians also get 1000DM per company to do humanitarian relief . Thus, one group was fixing up a dental clinic. They obtained the equipment from Canada. A local Canadian politician - a friend from the ice storm - is sending about $6000 of dental equipment. "It is out of the Canadians' specific mandate but soldiers enjoy volunteering for this stuff." To keep up their skills, the doctors also do humanitarian assistance twice a week at Bihac hospital. This hospital was in the line of fire and is in really bad shape. It was bombed to hell but the Canadians have rebuilt it. "When our medicines are in the window of six months' expiry date we give them to the hospital."

Another group had two Hearts-and-Minds projects: they rebuilt a foot bridge along local water falls in a Serbian area. Sometimes there is a little competition with the NGOs for projects. For example, one group wanted to put in a woodshed in a school in the Republic of Serbska. However, an aid agency beat them to it, so now they have to identify another school for their woodshed. Canadians also take on families and drop off goods/aid. "We have six families that we provide aid for." (They are Serbian, Bosnian, and Croatian.) These families "were handed off to us by our predecessors." Through this relationship, these families became dependent on the group and now the Canadians cannot cut the umbilical cord. Another group drops off food and water to isolated families. With the onset of winter, Canadians will start chopping wood for the local families so that they might heat their homes. The Canadians co-ordinate this with the NGOs who drop off the wood, and then the Canadians come and chop it.

Some soldiers resent this work: "I hate cutting wood for people who can cut their own." This reminds them of the problems they had in the ice storm when "lazy" Canadians expected soldiers to shovel their driveways for them.

But the work done by Canadian personnel in-theatre is only part of a very complex relationship between the military and the local population. Canadian Forces personnel, when contacting the local population, encounter many forms of cultural tensions. In particular, they face ethical dilemmas of how to treat impoverished locals, how to remain neutral in a conflict-ridden society, and how to deal with pervasive corruption. The Ethics Survey conducted with members of the Canadian military illustrates this cultural tension. "Dealing with an uneducated and poor populace in a condescending and intrusive way."[83] "Those accepting the company of and sexual favors from young girls and women whom naively look for a ticket out of their country and promising such help in return for their company."[84] "Allowing oneself to be sucked into an economy where bribery and black market dealings are rampant."[85] "Because of inexperience in not recognizing that a belligerent party who is being nice or friendly and who provides gifts, foods, alcohol, etc., at times, is doing so to compromise you. An offering of gifts and friendship was often for ulterior motives. Unless you recognized the issue, you became biased or favoured one side/party over the other."[86] "CANBAT I during OP Harmony our unit was garrisoned on the Kryina side of the zone of separation. Living on the Serbian side (or any single side) created ethical dilemmas, in that there exists the tendency to see the conflict through the eyes of the people you live with (children, hospitals, human rights, etc.) and thus the potential to become prejudiced became great, particularly as seen through the soldiers' eyes. Ensuring that operations are carried out and without these prejudices is an ethical challenge."[87] "Bribery attempts range from what is locally accepted business practice to illegal activity. An example of the former would include gifts and cash to the unit supply officer to cement a local procurement contract."[88] "We saw lots of criminal activity by local police, including beatings and graft. How do you work with them when they behave this way and you need to maintain their trust? At what point to you step in and say enough is enough?"[89] The Ethics Survey pointed out that bribery and attempted bribery by locals (for example, by contractors in order to get work) was the 2nd most cited ethical dilemma identified by respondents.[90]

6. Military relationships with International Relief Agencies and NGOs

In this section we will look at the international agencies which Canadian Forces work with in theatre. We will also examine points of tension which can arise from

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[83] Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 20/34.
[84] Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 20/34.
[85] Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 20/34.
[86] Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 19/34.
[87] Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 19/34.
[88] Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 17/34.
[89] Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 17/34.
[90] Maillet, *Canadian Forces Ethics and Peacekeeping Survey Report*, p. 3/34.

organizational differences concerning goals and tasks and ways of accomplishing them. There are a number of projects funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). "CIDA had given 250,000dm and the Brits have pumped a lot in. Other agencies are ECHO (EU), World Bank, OXFAM (Brit - working on the election grid in Dvar) CESVI (Italian - built 350 houses)". Canadians work closely with the UNHCR to anticipate needs. However, I was told that the demands are small compared to 1994-1995 when the UNHCR used Canadian military vehicles. When they first arrived, the NGOs wanted the members of 3RCR to deliver goods and cattle for them. The military said no, however they do share information with the NGOs through the population survey the CIMIC people carry out. Canadian military personnel monitor returning refugees and they sometimes cut and drop off wood for the NGOs.

Other forms of co-operation are medical. Once a month, the Head of Medical Unit has a meeting with the World Health Organization, and (s)he also keeps in contact with other medical staff in the area (for example, Médecins Sans Frontières) about the main medical problems in the region. These are mainly TB, AIDS, communicable skin diseases, oral hygiene, and cancer. The Canadian military also co-operates with the UN Mine Action Centre. The UN requests someone to work in the mine action center. While I was there the military had someone in Bihac working as the Centre co-ordinator. This major was seconded to the Centre. He checks safety, techniques used to actually clear mines, and that the right people for the job are hired.

Canadian officers also manage projects for the Canada Fund, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the British Overseas Development Agency. The army liaison officer puts together projects. CIDA and the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) pick through the proposals and find what they want. These small projects include the distribution of small farm equipment. The military is not involved with humanitarian decisions at a very high level. Here in the AOR "we are just the execution aspect of the operation." NGOs and the military sometimes have different ways of accomplishing their tasks -- for example, militaries like to do things for people rather than with them.

The number of NGOs in areas of conflict has increased dramatically in the post-Cold War period and so has their impact on these crises. They are often the first to enter and the last to leave. There are literally hundreds of NGOs operating in Bosnia. They encompass a wide variety of organizations often with varying tasks, goals, competence, types of personnel, etc. which can make liaisons with them at times difficult. There are large organizations such as CARE Canada which are active in the Canadian AOR. CARE International has a program of home visits for isolated elderly folks. Danish Mobile Hospital has a container clinic program. There are several examples of projects which have been initiated with the help of Canadian Cooperation Fund grants. Terre des Hommes, a Swiss charity, opened up youth centers in Prijrdor, Bosanska Krupa, and Banja Luka. Conflict Resolution Catalysts has a program to teach teachers how to deal with aggression in 11-17 year olds and a peer mediation training program which worked in cooperation with youth centers established by Terre des Hommes. The Spanish Charity, Movimen[illegible]por la paz, el desarme, y la

libertad (MODL) supported youth sports and social activities for refugees in collective centers.[91]

An important of the NGO-military relationship is related to security. All NGOs understand the need for security. This is particularly important since some NGOs were targeted in riots in Drvar in the Canadian AOR. The Canadian military is thus there to assure security if things should become tense. Another thing the NGOs can do during an emergency is to come onto the Canadian military's radio net. With the Kosovo crisis and the threat - however remote - of evacuation, the NGOs started showing up more often and checking in. Each person working for an NGO has a number and they call in and say which numbers are where so they can be evacuated. I was also told cynically that civilian agencies also come to the platoon houses for a free meal. This became such as habit that the camp in Dvar began charging the NGO personnel for their meals.

The UNHCR Regional Office in Banja Luka provides a forum for the coordination of NGO programs and assets, but it is the CIMIC coordination centres that permit the detailed cooperation between the many NGOs and local authorities. The Canadian military tries to facilitate the sharing of information and promotes coordination between these NGOs in theatre. The CIMIC liaison section in the Battle Group I visited consisted of 18 people and their role was to assist the international organizations in the AOR (the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),the UNHCR, and their partners). The CIMIC liaison section also assists co-operation with the municipal and cantonment authorities in their efforts to successfully implement the civil aspects of the Dayton accords. For example they co-ordinate with the UNHCR to help the DPREs. CIMIC also has the task to conduct liaison efforts with IOs (international organizations), such as the UNHCP and the IPTF (International Police Task Force), who are the Dayton Accord's implementing partners.

CIMIC units also deal with the smaller NGOs in the AOR. One of the problems these civilian organizations face is that they are small. They have to be small to keep their overhead down and be capable of direct action. However, because they are small they often lack access to current information and they cannot coordinate with other organizations. According to one CIMIC officer, "Smaller NGOs have [a] more narrow focus. They want the most bang for their money. It's an ad hoc situation. They just show up at the micro-credit meeting." Another problem is that NGOs sometimes use locals to carry out their activities, "Our interaction is primarily with the local population. When we run across an NGO administrator we try to get as much information from him as possible. But often they are just local contractors working on projects and they know nothing."

The Canadian military organizes regular meetings plus ad hoc information-sharing. One of the mechanisms for this is the called the Principals Group. The Principals Group of NGOs meets in the Canadian camp in Coralici. The military facilitates the meeting and produces the agenda. "We decide the focus and explain why so we can have a common effort." The military tries to be sensitive to the NGOs. "We don't want to appear heavy- handed so we try to arrive at consensus." In this way, the

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[91] David M. Last, "Defeating Fear and Hatred Through Peacebuilding: Multiplying the Impact of a Military Contribution," *Canadian Foreign Policy*, 5, No. 2 (Winter 1998), p. 162.

military tries to develop and co-ordinate NGO strategy. "It is important to show consistency of effort." This can be difficult since some NGOs do not like the military and some do not like other NGOs. For example, the NGOs which were targeted during the Dvar riots thought this happened because of their contacts with SFOR. As a result, since then, they have cut all contacts with the military. Another gap in the information-sharing relates to Islamic activities. The Canadians have little or no information of any development actions from Islamic groups.

The Canadian military has to be careful about maintaining objectivity and keeping credibility with the locals and other NGOs since there is sometimes conflict between the various NGOs in theatre. Sometimes local politicians try to divide and conquer the IOs and NGOs to foster their own ends. The inability of NGOs to collaborate with each other was often cited as a problem during my trip to Bosnia. I was told "NGOs are a business, each with their own agenda and sometimes their own agendas don't coincide with other NGO activities. Sometimes NGOs don't want to talk to each other." For example, UNHCR wanted to return refugees (Serbs) while the IOR wanted to get the (Croat) Council going. "So they have different mandates and get into conflict with each other." One of the characteristics of peace operations is that it is sometimes the lower levels of command (that is, at the Major level) that have to deal with humanitarian agencies' differences. It is also important to note that officers and NCOs experience more contact with non-military persons than with enlisted soldiers.[92] However, the officers on the tour I visited did have practice in facing these difficulties from participating in domestic disaster relief. "Aid agencies don't co-operate with each other. During the ice storm it was the same way. In fact there are a lot of similarities. The NGOs here seem to be working at cross-purposes to each other just like at home."

Questions of age, gender and race can exacerbate the gap between NGOs and the military. The military is a conservative organization as compared to NGOs which tend to attract young socially conscious individuals and many of them are female. For example, UN agencies such as the UNHCR recruit women on a positive-discrimination basis which means that half of the staff of UN agencies and NGOs operating in Bosnia are female. [93] Female UNHCR officials, and the UNHCR's multinational staff, presented problems for some officers who are accustomed to dealing with men.[94] The brevity of military tours (usually six months) can also cause tension with NGOs. "Once familiarized with local conditions, officers have little time left to establish solid working relationships with their civilian counterparts, or acclimatize themselves to local values, culture and politics... By contrast, it is unusual for civilians to serve for less than 12 months... It was not unusual for civilians with UNPROFOR to be in their post for three years."[95]

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[92] In a survey of 1,200 members of the CF who participated in UNPROFOR, enlisted soldiers reported working with interpreters and having social interactions with the locals as their major contact experience. NCOs also had that profile in addition to having to negotiate with non-military. All the officers had been interviewed by the media in addition to working with interpreters, and negotiating with non-military and military. David Last, *Theory, Doctrine and Practice of Conflict De-Escalation in Peacekeeping Operations* (Cornwallis, Nova Scotia: Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, 1997), p. 80.

[93] Michael Williams, *Civil Military Relations and Peacekeeping*, Adelphi Paper 321 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998), p. 34.

[94] Williams, *Civil Military Relations and Peacekeeping*, p. 37.

[95] Williams, *Civil Military Relations and Peacekeeping*, p. 36.

The UNHCR is one of the most important UN agencies in peace operations since it often takes the lead. Although the military and the UNHCR are developing better ways of working together there are still difficulties. According to Col Bob Stewart, the commander of the first British deployment to Bosnia in 1992: "The military are hierarchical, authoritarian, centralized, large and robust, while UNHCR is flat, consensus-based with highly decentralized field offices."[96] According to Williams, the UNHCR's perceived lack of structure and tendency to delegate decision-making to people of a much younger age than the military was an additional source of frustration.[97] From the UNHCR's point of view, the presence of the military can compromise their work. For example, while UNPROFOR convoy escorts provided protection and deterred attack, their presence in some cases heightened local hostility.[98]

Many NGOs regard the military as out of touch with the values and members of society they seek to protect. In contrast, NGOs are flexible and anti-bureaucratic. "These organizations form the nucleus of an international civil society whose *esprit de corps* distrusts national military structures. They therefore tend to resist attempts by the security-conscious military to coordinate their activities in the field."[99] As the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff, General Maurice Baril has remarked: "Humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations seemed to be in every area of conflict but remained independent and reluctant to modify their approach and agree to coordinate their efforts with the military force."[100]

The military, on the other hand, perceives NGOs as being undisciplined "non-guided organizations", as one military person remarked to me. David Owen found the military in Bosnia "bitter in their denunciation of some of the NGOs who to them were a pestilential nuisance, resisting all attempts at coordination and then complaining that they were not properly protected."[101] Canadians were equally cynical concerning NGOs, saying that the NGOs wanted nothing to do with the military until there was a perceived security threat, then they started showing up to make sure that they could be evacuated or protected by the military.

Nonetheless, there appears to be a growing recognition by Canadian Forces of the value of working with NGOs. "The Canadian military, in collaboration with the NGO community, has developed a Disaster Assistance Response Team. This helps each community to view the other as equally professional and committed to common objectives. After one military-NGO exercise, a Canadian Defence Ministry official noted that some NGO workers had more battlefield experience than most Canadian Forces personnel."[102] As well, the Canadian armed forces in 1996 began an exchange with the NGO CARE in which an officer is attached to the organization on a six-month basis.

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[96] cited in Williams, *Civil Military Relations and Peacekeeping*, p. 36.
[97] Williams, *Civil Military Relations and Peacekeeping*,p. 37.
[98] Williams, *Civil Military Relations and Peacekeeping*, p. 40.
[99] Williams, *Civil Military Relations and Peacekeeping*, p. 39.
[100] Maurice Baril, "Peacekeeping and Force" in *Peacekeeping with Muscle: The Use of Force in International Conflict Resolution*, eds. Alex Morrison, Douglas Fraser, and James Kiras (Cornwallis Park, NS: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997), p. 119.
[101] David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1995), p. 208.
[102] Cited in Williams, *Civil Military Relations and Peacekeeping*, p. 41.

7. Military relationships with the Media

The Canadian military is suffering from a Somalia hangover[103] and, as a result, has a tremendous mistrust and antipathy towards the media. At the same time that Canadians are gun-shy with the media, the belligerents and NGOs seem to have no hesitation to use the media to their advantage.

The tension between the media and the military is described by Canadian General Michel Maisonneuve, former Chief of Operations in UNPROFOR headquarters, who tells us:

> With the advent of instant information, the public may know, faster than the chain-of-command, that an accident has occurred. The media interpret and analyze the event and 'fact' is formed. The effect of this instant information is that our contingent commanders must compete with the media to ensure the rapid transmission of accurate information to decision-makers, both military and political.
> The Commander must also be able to counter misinformation in such a manner that his force is seen as the credible source. Used effectively, the media is a tool which provides a valuable alternative to the use of force. Under certain circumstances, the belligerents could attempt to use the media as a tool to force certain behaviours from peace forces. On the other hand, media presence may influence the belligerents into performing certain actions which might avoid our use of force. The media then becomes our tool. [104]

He later goes on to give an example from IFOR: "After a local agreement was made with a former warring faction, the opening of a checkpoint was only accomplished after the arrival of the media. The belligerents did not want to appear to be uncooperative."[105]

The Canadian Public Information officer promotes SFOR to the local population while the Public Affairs Officer promotes the Battle Group to Canada. I asked who they had visiting the Battle Group. "Mainly small-town people doing features." I was told that the military sees the visits of the media as more positive and they are not so heavy- handed with the media. The media can go where they like but they have to stay in the Canadian AOR. Nevertheless, soldiers and officers were very critical of the media: "The media feel themselves the self-appointed reps of the Canadian people." Another example: "The media is gender- focused so ignore 90-95% of what we are doing here." People were resentful of the media who, on visiting the camp, focused on gender issues, which interfered with the work of female soldiers. "They were supposed to be doing research on how Canadians were dealing with ethnic conflict. Then the article came out and it was trivializing the work of the female

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[103] From 1995 to 1997 there was a public inquiry into the activities of Canadian peacekeepers in Somalia. The media did a very public vivisection of the Canadian Forces during this time and the relationship between the Canadian Forces and the media suffered. For details, see Donna Winslow and. Christ Klep, "Learning Lessons the Hard Way. Somalia and Srebrenica Compared," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*. forthcoming

[104] Maisonneuve, "Practical Aspects of the Use of Force in Peace Operations," p. 146.

[105] Maisonneuve, "Practical Aspects of the Use of Force in Peace Operations," p. 150.

soldiers. This depressed everyone since it was a sophomoric profile of the issue of the woman soldier. Therefore people feel burned and will be more careful next time."

Even if soldiers were upset with journalists, "It's okay just as long as THEY GET IT RIGHT", one person said with emphasis. The journalists trivialize things, over-dramatize things, and get details wrong. "Journalists never send anything back to be checked for accuracy." One officer commented that he was angry because the journalist who did an article on what his Company did for the dental clinic got the name of the Company wrong. He goes on to say: "Canadian soldiers overseas are not news like the US military. We are mostly forgotten." Other soldiers were more explicit: "The media are muck-rakers."

8. Conclusions

A qualitative change took place in the post Cold-War period in the types of peace operation that Canadians are now asked to participate in. Missions are more and more tasked with facilitating humanitarian relief and social reconstruction and protecting civilians in areas where there is no peace. Moreover, we no longer protect national sovereignty as we intervene more and more in intrastate conflicts. The mandates are wider and more ambiguous and the tasks more multi-dimensional and multi-functional.

According to Williams,[106] "civil-military relations in peacekeeping, peace-enforcing or peace-building operations are fundamentally different from those that pertain in 'normal' conditions of peace or war." In the new forms of peace operations there are larger numbers of civilians involved, whether they be working within the mission (the UN and its agencies); on the fringes of the mission (NGOs) or outside the mission (the local population). Williams goes on to say that "[i]n contemporary peacekeeping the military have taken on new and significant political roles". The military are now asked to broker deals, shelter the displaced, protect human rights, supervise the return of refugees, organize and monitor elections, and support civilian reconstruction.[107] In these circumstances, civilian and military cooperation is called for and an effective interface for civil military cooperation becomes essential.

The biggest problem for Canadian soldiers is their ability to respect Canadian cultural norms (honesty, integrity, responsibility, self-discipline, and respect for law and legitimate authority) while dealing with cultural differences, particularly unethical behavior either by belligerents (bribery, fraud, abuse, criminal activity, etc.), international aid workers (theft), or other national contingents (inequality, theft, black marketeering, etc.).

Canada now has a number of initiatives under way to improve civil military relations. There is the Pearson Peacekeeping Center which runs classes for Canadians and international participants - military and NGO alike - on a variety of peace related issues from ethics to culture. As already noted, the Canadian Forces has also established links to the NGO community by sending an officer for six months to an NGO to learn more about the way it operates. Also, in July 1996 Canada established a

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[106] Williams, *Civil Military Relations and Peacekeeping*, p.15.

[107] Williams, *Civil Military Relations and Peacekeeping*, p.14.

Peace Support Training Center in Ontario as a center of excellence for pre-deployment training for all peace – support missions. Since Somalia, there has been improved training on the handling of detainees and prisoners of war, interrogations, and conduct after capture. Greater emphasis has been placed on training in the laws of armed conflict.